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Summary  findings
Financial reform of one type or another has been  framework that encourages prudent behavior and is
increasingly popular since the early 1970s, but  attuned  to both institutions and the structure of the
disappointment with the fruits of reform has been  economy. Bank failure may reflect poor management,
common. Reformers in Africa and in transitional  but poor management in turn reflects regulation that is
economies have been especially disappointed, perhaps  not "incentive compatible." Caprio reviews options that
because of their high expectations.  would align bankers' incentives with society's preferences
Reform may also disappoint partly because of perverse  for safe and sound banking.
sequencing. Often the more visible aspects of reform  Adopting a framework that rewards prudent risk-
(such as complete deregulation of interest rates,  taking will produce a more stable banking system. And
recapitalization of banks, and more recently the creation  because participants in the financial system - both
of stock exchanges) are pursued before basic financial  individuals and organizations - take time to adjust to
infrastructure  (including auditing, accounting, and legal  changes in incentives, it is important to begin reshaping
systems and basic regulations) are established.  the regulatory environment early in the reform process,
Caprio focuses here on regulatory options  in banking.  at the same time as other measures are being taken to
He argues that for reform to succeed and for financial  develop institutions.
systems to remain stable, there must be a regulatory
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This paper was presented at a Brookings/KPMG  conference on the Sequencing of Financial Reforms.  The
author is indebted to conference participants, in particular David Cole, Maxwell Fry, Barry Johnston, Ross
Levine, and Betty Slade for lucid comments.  Joaquin Gutierrez and David Scott, in addition to former
colleagues  at the Federal Reserve Board, taught me much of what I know about bank supervision,  even if they
might  not agree with  the conclusions  I have reached. Discussions  with Millard Long over several years helped
clarify the options presented herein.I.  Introduction
Financial  reforms of one type or another  have been of increasing  popularity  since  the
appearance  of McKinnon's (1973)  seminal  volume.  However, disappointment  with the  fruits
of this reform process are common,  especially  in Africa and in transitional  economies,  in part
perhaps because of reformers' high expectations. Disappointment with reform  might also be
due to perverse sequencing: often more visible aspects of reform, such as complete  interest
rate deregulation,  bank recapitalization,  or more recently, the creation of  stock  exchanges,
have been pursued before basic infrastructure  in finance - auditing, accounting,  legal
systems, and basic regulations  -- have  been prepared (Caprio, Atiyas and Hanson, 1994).
This paper will focus on the latter factor, and argue that it is not just having  any regulatory
framework, but rather one both attuned  to the institutions and structure  of the economy  and
that encourages  prudent behavior,  which is important to the overall success  of reforms  and the
stability of the financial  system. Moreover, because participants  in the financial  system, both
individuals  and organizations,  take time to adjust to changes in incentives,  as noted  below, it is
important  to begin re-shaping  the regulatory  environment early on in the reform  process, along
with other institutional  development  measures.
The next section focuses  on why regulatory changes -- along with other financial
reforms -- are so difficult and discusses  the problems with current popular approaches  in
industrial and developing  countries,  which  puts supervision as the first line of defense  against
unsafe and unsound  banking  practices. Then section III will lay out what are possible  options
Ifor building safer and more sound banking systems  and argue that a fundamental element in
any change for the better should include aligning incentives of bank owners with the goals of
the country and the national authorities (that is, making the system "incentive compatible"),
which should include the mobilization of savings and their efficient and prudent allocation.
The options for better banking include: letting depositors  have more of their funds at risk (a
form  of co-insurance),  mandating or inducing (through  higher liability limits) significantly
higher capital adequacy ratios above those recommnended by the Basle Committee, narrow
banking,  stricter entry limits to reduce competition  in some financial systems, free banking,
and mandatory diversification ratios.  Enhanced  supervision,  which would complement all of
these options except for free banking, would occupy  a supporting role, as it did in most
counitries prior to the 1930s.
Developing and transitional country authorities  increasingly are following what might be
called the OECD-standard model: 8% risk-adjusted  capital adequacy ratios and "beefed-up"
supervision,  with implicit or explicit deposit insurance  the norm.  All of the proposals
discussed below in contrast appear quite radical and leave this paper open to the criticism of
being unrealistic.  Perhaps the best response to these concerns is that if a new model is not
being considered now, when large losses have been sustained in developing and industrial
economies,  perhaps these considerations will be more realistic after the next wave of crises,
when still larger losses can be expected.  For some countries where the losses have already
been quite large, as in Japan, Mexico, and Venezuela,  or the injections of capital repeated,
such as in Hungary, the future might be now.
2II.  Why are Regulatory  Changes  so Difficult
An observer new to financial issues might well ask why are financial reforms,  including
regulatory  changes, so difficult, both to put in place and "get right," but also to evaluate.
First,  there is no simple index of successful financial reform.  As noted by Levine (this
volume),  finance performs a variety of functions,  many  of which are difficult to measure.
Even if one were to confine the analysis to changes in banking, the indicators that are readily
available  -- banks' balance sheet and income statements  -- are subject to a variety of reporting
differences  and also can be manipulated to show what owners would like to convey.  For
example,  as shown by de Juan (1988), the easiest way to improve on how a given loan looks is
by granting another one to the same borrower,  the practice of "evergreening."  He also
illustrated  clearly how banks that are in trouble  - often due to insufficient diversification  or
interest rate or exchange rate mismatch -- can in effect build their balance sheet and income
statement from the bottom up (for example, beginning  first with the dividends they think it
necessary to pay and arriving later at the interest income needed to justify the given dividend).
With this amount of freedom, depositors,  shareholders,  and even supervisors will have a
difficult time in reading accurately the condition of a bank.  Only recently have firm level data
become available in a few developing countries,  which permit the assessment of how the
allocation  of capital has changed (Schiantarelli et al.,  1994) and, by implication, how the
banking system is performing one of its key roles,  but this analysis does not elucidate the
performance of individual banks.  A second reason for the difficulty in assessing reform,  and
the focus of the remainder of this section, is that at least one part of the answer to how
reforms will fare depends on a variety of factors, many of which are difficult to quantify.
3Although many have argued that financial reforms will depend on macroeconomic
factors,  often this reasoning began with a now outdated approach which itself assumes that
finance is unimportant and at best only passively reflects the workings of the macro economy.
Gertler and Rose (1994) instead cast the argument  in a modem framework, one which assumes
information asymmetries and then derives that,  in such an environment, lending decisions will
depend importantly on borrower net worth.  Shocks that reduce borrower  net worth will drive
up the premium for external finance, reduce investment, and thereby potentially impair
intermediaries.  Regulatory changes at times of improving borrower net worth will appear
judicious,  even if they entail significant future costs,  while those preceding a collapse of
borrower  net worth will tend to be labelled failures,  regardless of their merit.  Given the
crucial dependence of reforms and regulatory  changes on borrower net worth, it would appear
sensible, as argued in Caprio, Atiyas and Hanson (1994), to wait several business cycles
before drawing firm conclusions about the success  of any changes.  '
In addition to borrower net worth,  reforms  affecting the banking system will depend on
a variety of initial conditions, including the initial balance sheet and how it is allocated,  the
endowment of information and human capital,  and most importantly, the incentive systems in
financial intermediaries. 2 Although reform programs  often take account of the starting balance
sheet, usually the focus is only on whether the bank begins with positive or negative net
worth.  To be sure, net worth is an important variable, but attention on this variable has biased
reforms to assuming that once any solvency problems have been fixed, little else need be done
to ensure that banks will operate in a safe and sound matter.  Yet, the allocation of assets
4matters importantly  as well: a skewed balance sheet before reform can lead to rapid
reallocations  as constraints  are eased.  And simnultaneous  portfolio  reallocation  by an entire
banking system  can produce swings in asset prices that have the potential  to be destabilizing,
as attested  to by cases as diverse  as those associated  with housing and land price bubbles in
Scandinavia,  Japan, and Malaysia (Caprio et al, 1994).
But even when  these balance sheet variables are taken into account, the other
aforementioned  initial  conditions can lead to post-reform  problems. If banks only or
predominantly  have information  about unprofitable  sectors, then they will tend either to
continue  lending  to businesses  they understand, even if unprofitable,  or to underinvest in risky
projects.  The former case could be expected, for example,  when state-owned  banks in a
transitional  economy  are accustomed  to dealing with (or compelled  to continue  lending to)
state-owned  enterprises,  or perhaps when private banks that already are bust undertake to lend
to highly risky clients.  In this case they might be willing  to lend at high interest rates based
on the (small)  chance  that the client might be able to repay and thereby rescue the bank from
insolvency.  When  banks are solvent and profit maximizing,  they tend to retreat from lending
when information  capital is depleted, especially when accounting  and auditing  standards, the
basis for much financial  information,  are underdeveloped. 3
Weak human  capital, a routine feature of banking systems  emerging  from a long period
of repression,  also can tend to exhaust even substantial  capital  holdings, a reason, it should be
clear, why significantly  high capital ratios are not sufficient  to ensure safe and sound banking.
5But even  more pernicious is the incentive  system in banks following  prolonged repression. To
the extent  that it reflects the pre-reform environment,  which may have emphasized  lending for
unprofitable  activities, it can continue to distort the allocation  of capital long after reforms
have been instituted. If the incentive  system favors lending regardless of return, or acting like
an employment  agency, rather than a bank, it will be difficult  to turn around the organization
without  significant  change, most likely including  some change of ownership.  State owned
banks are particularly  difficult  to change, as profits are not the final goal and, at least in most
state-owned  banks with which the author is familiar, compensation  differentials  are
compressed  and are not used to motivate staff.  4
One popular example of slow-changing  incentives  in banking is the U.S. case after the
creation of federal deposit insurance. Although  this reform, enacted in 1933, might have been
expected  to lead to more risk taking on the part of bankers, in fact for the following  20-30
years, bankers -- those who lived through the many banking failures or the 1920s and 1930s --
remained  quite conservative. It was only as nonbanks  began to make significant  competitive
inroads into the banking  business, and the Depression-era  bankers retired, that "go-go"
banking  became  popular. 5 Reforms  might be expected to lead to more rapid changes where
such significant  shocks are absent and where the banking system is in private hands.  State-
owned  banks tend to be much less, if at all, responsive  to economic  forces induced  by
reforms, and thus might be expected to be the slowest of all to change.
Regulations  are an important  part of the initial conditions  -- in effect they are one of the
6most important variables external to banks that help determine,  with some lag, their internal
incentive systems.  For this reason, and because variations  in regulations can tak-e  time to
influence these incentive systems, and eventually banks'  performance,  it appears sensible to
strive for regulatory  change early in the reform process.  The optimality of this proposed
sequencing is even clearer when supervision is weak,  as then it will be important to have bank
owners'  and managers'  incentives aligned with the goals of the public for the financial system.
Most explicit or implicit models of banking regulation and supervision - certainly those
in virtually every OECD country today, with the notable exception of New Zealand-- assume
an important role for bank supervision by government.6 Part of the popularity of this model
likely results from the post-World War II enthusiasm  with the U.S.  economy, even though,
due in large part to political resistance to the emergence  of truly national banks. the U.S.
banking system historically has been relatively weak.  Where there are so many banks --
30,000 in the United States in the early 1920s and about  12,000 today -- and (at least in part)
as a result so many bank failures, it might be understandable  that supervision has acquired
some popularity.
Developing bank supervision likely is important  for developing and transitional
economies, as often their pre-reform system is based only on verifying that banks have
complied with different regulations concerning the direction of credit.  Supervision can
provide a credible threat that unsound or fraudulent  activities might be detected and punished.
7However, it is difficult  to believe  that supervision ever can fulfill a role that some have foisted
on it, namely that of serving  as the first line of defense against unsafe and unsound  banking.
Rolnick (1994)  argues  that it is quite easy for bankers to hop on a plane to Las Vegas
and put their entire assets at risk on the roulette wheel.  With limited  liability,  it is trivial for
them to hedge this risk and to wind  up at least no worse off than before. and possibly a good
deal richer.  Deposit  insurance,  either implicit or explicit, provides  bank-ers  with the incentive
to engage in such behavior,  if they are not highly rewarded for taking  prudent  risks.'  After
all, they can always  try to move  elsewhere  and try again. -Only the taxpayer  end up worse, in
effect blindly underwriting  risk taking that most - except for the owners  of the casinos -
would not knowingly  endorse.  Although admitEedly  a contrived example,  it illustrates  that, at
least in some cases, by the time supervisors  or depositors find out about  a problem, the bank
has already lost all of its capital.
In addition to the possibility  of fleet-footed  bankers, supervision  suffers  in many
countries, as it is difficult  to train and retain highly competent  supervisors,  primarily  because
their compensation  might be a fraction  of what private financial intermediaries  pay.  And, like
many generals, supervisors  have  a tendency  to fight the last war.  U.S. supervisors  - no doubt
true in Japan as well -- appear on the alert for overlending  to the real estate sector or to
developing  countries, but in all likelihood  the next wave of problems  will not come from either
but from a new risk, such as that posed by derivatives.'
8Moreover, even when  supervisors  know of a situation sufficientlv  early to prevent large
losses, they may be prevented  from acting by political forces.  In Chile. supervisors
maintained that they knew that bankers  were not covering their exchange  risk but were
prevented from requiring  it as a fixed exchange rate was government  policy. More blatant
cases of abusing  political  power, such as the attempt by U.S. Savings  and Loan (S&L)
executives to buy congressional  influence  and regulatory forbearance.  are all too common. In
Venezuela,  according  to the former head of the National Securities  Commission,  the problems
at Banco Latino, a "rogue"  bank, were known as early as 1992, though  the bank was only
closed in January 1994. While  it might turn out that losses began mounting  even more rapidly
in 1992, it is likely  that the bank had lost its capital by that point already,  and in fact had
actively been making poor credit decisions -- and bidding up deposit rates -- for some time.  9
Still, it was not until early 1994  that the bank was closed, and Banco  Latino's behavior already
had spread to other banks; it was estimated in late 1994 that 17 of the nations' 50 banks are in
critical condition and others  are receiving extensive government  support. 10 Inflation  also has
soared and capital flight has been associated  with an approximate  50% fall in the value of the
bolivar.
Lastly, strengthening  supervision  is an arduous task, and at best not a guaranteed  path to
a safe and sound banking  system  by itself.  Experienced supervisors  estimate  that it could take
many countries 5-10 years of substantial  training before their supenrisory  skills  would be near
the capacity found in industrial  countries.  Even if supervision  were the secret to better
banking, does it make sense  for countries starved of human capital  to allocate  significant  talent
9to supervising banks?
The preceding  comments  are not meant to suggest that supervision  is unimportant.
Good bank supervisors  can be an effective  ally for bank owners  and senior management,
helping to send a credible  signal  that fraud and unsafe practices will be punished.
Transforming  bank supervision  from a system  of checking on compliance  with credit
directives to one aimed  at encouraging  prudent risk taking is an important  effort in this regard.
But the point here is that without  motivated owners, supervision  alone  will in all likelihood be
ineffective.
M1.  Options  for Better  Banking
If the OECD model  based on enhanced supervision and an 8% risk-adjusted  capital ratio is not
likely to be a good  alternative  for developing  and transitional  economies,  what is?  This
section lays out and discusses  several options, not all of which are mutually  exclusive. Their
underlying theme is to improve in one way or another the incentives  facing  bankers.
The first option  calls for increased  monitoring of banks by depositors  -- that is a
complete or partial end to deposit  insurance.  The advantage  of this method is that depositors
with funds at risk have  the incentive  to invest effort in investigating  banks. The possibility
that they might move  their funds to better banks would provide some  incentive  for bankers to
behave more prudently. However, one important drawback  is that banks are inherently
10opaque institutions. and depositors'  ability to monitor  them effectively can easily be doubted,
as suggested above.  True, before deposit insurance,  more resources were invested in
unearthing  inforrnation about banks.  For example.  in the United States during the Free
Banking era,  "Bank-  Note Monitors" existed as daily periodicals to review the safety of various
banks.  Thus there is every reason to believe that new information sources would appear if
depositor  funds were at risk.
However. it is not clear that great weight should be placed on the shoulders of
depositors,  in view of  the inability of presumably  well informed -- and, with no safety net,
highly motivated - shareholders successfully to predict  bank failures."I Indeed, actual and
potential shareholders have access to substantial  information already.  Thus perhaps putting at
most some depositor funds at risk might be recommended.  Often, countries try to provide
insurance only for small depositors,  as larger depositors  are thought to be better informed,
along with having more funds at risk.  As Caprio and Summers (1995) argue, however,  it
makes little sense to make the holders of large depositors  feel more exposed to risk -- they
might run at the first scent of real or imagined trouble.  Moreover, they can always split up
their funds into smaller amounts or move accounts  offshore, where full insurance might be
provided.  And historically, at least in the U.S.  case, deposit insurance limits have grown due
to political forces. so a strategy based on limiting deposit insurance to small depositors may be
destined to be eroded over time (Calomiris  and White,  1993).
A more promising variant of this option, though  one that remains vulnerable to this last
11critique, is to in effect provide a co-insurance fund,  such as by letting 20% of each
depositor's  account be at risk (Boyd and Rolnick, 1989).  This would have the advantage of
increasing depositor monitoring without making depositors too  "jumpy," or to have their entire
deposits at risk without having a reasonable chance of being able to monitor effectively.
A second option, which could complement the first,  would to require bankers to hold
higher capital-asset ratios.  Higher capital in theory gives depositors,  shareholders, and
supervisors more time to detect unsafe practices, and increases the motivation of owners, as
they will want to protect their funds.  As supervisors point out, however,  the first fallback for
problem loans is provisions and earnings,  not capital.'2 Indeed, if bankers were motivated to
provision aggressively, little capital might be required.  Although it is true that in the 19th
century German and U.S.  banks routinely held capital ratios as high as 25-50%,  merely
mandating higher capital alone might not be successful, and indeed the 19th century practice of
holding more capital was not attained by fiat.  Moreover,  as noted above, a bank determined
to take significant risks can exhaust its capital rapidly, as in the case of Rolnick's casino
example, above.  Thus,  where supervisory  skills are in short supply, raising capital ratios
might provide greater comfort to authorities and to the public, but it would not appear to be a
first-best choice by itself.  Also, as with attempts to limit deposit insurance, it might be
impractical in a world of cheap computing and communications,  as banks can move offshore to
havens with lower capital requirements.  Although some governments -- especially those who
have just engaged in a costly bail out of the banking system -- might be willing to see their
banking industry move offshore, most will not tolerate this shift.
12Rather than mandating higher capital ratios, a related variant that is appealing.
especially given the difficulty in deciding how high a ratio is sufficient,  is to raise liability
limits on bankers.  In the United States before the 1920s, bank shareholders faced double
liability in many states, meaning that if losses exhausted the funds they put up as capital, then
their personal fortunes were liable for a post-closure assessment  in an amount up to the sum of
funds they had invested.  Even more severe, during the Scottish Free Banking Era (roughly
1700-1844). bankers faced unlimited liability;  not surprisingly,  this appears to have been a
time of quite prudent banking.  Of course, it is possible to raise the penalty for risk taking so
much that many prudent investments, which would produce faster growth, will not be
undertaken. 13  Unfortunately, there has been little variation of regulatory practice concerning
limits on the liability of bank shareholders to permit an empirical  analysis as to the optimal
levels.  Without such knowledge, authorities disposed to experiment might try raising liability
limits to 150% or 200%,  and see if this produces a desired change in banking practice without
excessively choking off the supply of risk capital.4
Another alternative here is to in effect raise liability through a system of mutual
liability, such as in the U.S. clearinghouse system, according  to which member banks were
liable for one another's  losses.  This system encouraged close supervision of member banks'
activities (Calomiris,  1993) and appears to work well as long as membership remains relatively
small.
A third option, and one that has enjoyed some popularity  in the United States among
13academic economists, is the narrow banking model  (Simons,  1948 and Litan. 1987),
according  to which banks would only be allowed to place their assets in safe instruments, such
as government  paper, while other institutions, which  would not be insured by the government,
would be freer to engage in riskier activities.  Banks then would be fail-proof. or if allowed to
hold high quality and highly liquid non-government  paper,  at least quite safe. and deposit
guarantees unlikely to be called.  All risky activities  would migrate to nonbank-  financial
intermediaries.  This proposal originated in the 1930s before the boom in mutual funds of the
1980s; supporters often point to the desirable risk-sharing  properties of having investors bear
part of the risk inherent in uncertain undertakings.  5
However,  there are several concerns with this proposal.  First, as noted by Calomiris
and Kahn (1991), notwithstanding recent changes in OECD markets,  banks have dominated
financial markets for many centuries, in part because  substantial information and enforcement
capability  are required for arms-length, nonbank  finance.  Any economies of scale and scope
in banking.  which admittedly have been difficult to corroborate  empirically, would be lost.
Second, requiring banks to hold safer assets lowers  the return they will pay and will produce  a
shift of funds to the presumably less regulated. non-bank  financial sector.  These institutions,
which would then dwarf their already large counterparts  today, would truly be too big to fail.
If U.S.  authorities could not allow the Chrysler  Motor  Company to go under, it is difficult to
believe that many governments could offer a credible guarantee that they would permit a huge
non-bank financial firm, one much closer to the payments  system than was Chrysler, to fail.
In sum, with either narrow banking or increased  liability  limits in banking, the danger is that
14government  guarantees will migrate along with depositors  funds to nonbanks -- in other words,
with more financial wealth in nonbanks, governments  will be pressed to provide some
guarantees  on these funds.  For governments that can adhere to the principle of insuring  only
those deposits  in narrow banks, this proposal  should be attractive.
The fourth option for authorities is to attempt to limit entry into banking sufficiently to
increase  the franchise value of bank licenses (Caprio  and Summers. 1995).  This proposal
argues  from U.S. evidence (Keeley, 1990) that banking began to become riskier in the 1950s,
when profits eroded as a result of the gradual increase  in competition from nonbanks and
foreign  institutions.  Limiting entry will increase  profits,  the discounted value of which
represents  the franchise value of possessing a charter  to do business as a bank.  If this value is
substantial,  then bank owners will take actions to ensure that they will be open and able to
earn those profits -- in other words, they will be motivated to behave in a safe and sound
manner.  Bank licenses could either be given away  or sold, though if too high a price were
charged  it would greatly reduce the franchise  value and so lead to unsafe banking.
Few countries have completely open entry  into banking, and most require some initial
capital,  evidence of banking skills, and a good reputation for honesty.  Indeed, some countries
have insufficient competition, due to a variety  of disincentives, from the small size of the
potential market -- true in a number of African economies,  in particular -- to various taxes on
financial intermediation (Chamley and Honohan).  By giving away "admission tickets"  into
banking,  this proposal might reward corruption,  as bribing officials in charge of licenses  can
15be  expected where licenses are valuable.  However,  charging instead a high entry fee (initial
capital) rewards previous beneficiaries of "the system."  Thus, a distinct advantage is that this
system could allow for new entrepreneurs  to enter  into banking, a distinct advantage in early
U.S.  history and possibly in transitional economies  as well, where there might be a desire  not
to reward  friends of the former system.
The chief drawback of trying to raise franchise  value, is that it is difficult to maintain  a
lid on entry if profits are high.  Authorities that attempted to establish excessive monopoly
power by awarding relatively few charters  would see nonbanks arise that performed many of
the same functions.  Relatedly, it is difficult to define the number of charters to grant, and
some arbitrariness as to who receives them is unavoidable.  Still, systems based on minimum
capital ratios have arbitrary requirements for capital,  which if set too high also can prompt
disintermediation.  And although raising capital can drive intermediation offshore,  with entry
restricted there would be an excess demand for bank licenses." 6 So this approach would call for
balancing incentives for prudent banking with pressures  to compete away banking business.
Perhaps the most important feature of this approach to financial regulation is that it focusses
on the incentives facing bank owners, and is based  on the assumption -- confirmed it appears
in the U.S.  example -- that as these incentives are eroded bankers will naturally respond by
taking on riskier exposures.
A last option to improve safety and soundness  in banking is the complete opposite of
monopoly banking, namely the free banking model in which anyone can establish a bank with
virtually no limits on their activities.  It should be clear that deposit insurance and free entry
16are incompatible: in concert, they would attract unsavory elements into the industry.
Therefore,  as occurred in the United States and Scotland during their free banking eras,  no
deposit insurance should be provided under this option.  Even without deposit insurance,
however,  authorities would be unwise to permit free entry if owners face limited liability,  and
instead employ either double-, triple-,  or unlimited liability, as discussed above.
A key advantage of free banking is that it frees up the supervisory apparatus that,  in
varying degrees. is part of each of the above systems.  By requiring depositors to monitor
banks without full or partial insurance,  free banking suffers from the same advantages and
drawbacks  as noted in the discussion of option 1. And if liability limits remained too low,
failures could occur with pressure for government  bailouts.  Alternatively, if liability limits
were  set too high. the provision of loans for risky undertakings might be in short supply,
relative to socien's  preferences."
WIhichever  of these options are pursued,  authorities  should keep in mind that the
majority of bank failures are caused by insufficient diversification, albeit for different
reasons.18 While the different options listed above would motivate owners to avoid a
voluntary  concentration of risk, authorities should make sure that their regulations do not
mandate or reward excessive portfolio concentration.  In small economies, limits on capital
flows do precisely this: if banks cannot invest abroad,  their portfolios necessarily will be
exposed to shocks to the leading export goods.  Many prices will be affected when the terms
of trade declines. the more so the smaller the economy,  so authorities in small economies
17should  move aggressively  to lift portfolio limits on banks.  Indeed, one could even conceive of
a requirement  that domestic  banks in a small economy  invest some portion of their assets
abroad. To ensure that these funds are not squandered  on risky foreign investments,  foreign
investrnents  could be limited to shares in diversified  mutual funds, at least until greater risk
management  expertise  were acquired.
Conclusions  and Guidelines  for Safer Banking
"The" right regulatory model for developing and transitional economies -- and in the author's
view, industrial countries as well -- is not yet known and may well not even be unique for all
countries.  Different institutions -- in the sense of rules, laws, and customs that regulate
economic activities -- likely fit better with different options for banking and finance.
However, the direction of reform is clear.  Aligning bank owners'  and managers'  incentives
with actions consistent with prudent risk taking -- in short, making the system incentive
compatible -- would lift the excessive burden that has been placed on bank supervisors and
more broadly on government to guarantee safe and sound banking.  If owners have more at
stake -- through increasing the impact of risk on their reputation, their deposits, present
capital, personal assets, or future expected profits -- they can be expected to take greater
measures to safeguard their bank than under the present system in most countries with limited
liability, modest capital requirements,  and some form of deposit guarantee.
A  cost of the above proposals is that they will tend to widen interest rate spreads ---
18either through less competition, higher capital, greater segmentation, or more generally by
reducing government subsidies for risk taking.  However, in the narrow banking or free
banking variants,  it is likely that savers would face a variety of choices as to how much risk
they need face.  And with any of these proposals, governments that have been restricting
capital mobility have the option of increasing the ability of banks to diversify and thereby
lower spreads.  Conversely, the less the ability to diversify risk,  the higher the required capital
or the expected future profits needed to ensure safe banking.  By widening spreads and/or by
diverting local savings from domestic investment, these proposals appear to be counter to
many governments'  development efforts.  However, the argument is that by better protecting
savers (and taxpayers!), and also by improving the local investment climate, authorities might
be able both to allow for greater diversification and to increase the supply of investible
resources to the local economy.  Most importantly, given increasing evidence on the
importance of the efficiency with which funds are invested, compared with the total level of
savings, as an engine of economic growth, these proposals,  by better aligning bankers'
incentives with prudent risk taking, should help to enhance development through improved
resource allocation.  Since even tiny improvements in factor productivity can pay substantial
dividends, it would appear likely that the benefits of regulatory reform will be well worth the
cost.
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21NOTES
And, as suggested above, to base conclusions, where possible,  on the ability of intermediaries to raise funds
and to allocate them prudently.
2  Information capital is the accumulation of information on clients and risks which banks build up over time.  As
argued by Caprio (Chapter 3 in Caprio, Atiyas, and Hanson,  1994), banks will invest in information capital up to the
point at which its marginal product equals the cost of additional  information.  The latter in general will be higher in
developing countries, due to the shortage of accounting and auditing skills and standards, rating agencies, etc.  Also.
prolonged financial repression often leads banks to underinvest in information capital, and to acquire it in
uneconomic -- often highly protected -- sectors.
Bernanke (1983) associates the contraction of lending in the United States during the depression with the
destruction of information capital that was possessed by the several thousand failed banks.
4  Occasionally government officials will point to French state-owned banks as evidence that state ownership can
work in this industry.  However, the losses experienced by Credit Lyonnais, estimated at over $1 billion, should put
to rest to this example.  Also, that the French state owned banks  performed as well as they did in part was a
testament to the govermment's  willingness to interfere relatively  little in compensation decisions. Most governments
hold wages in state banks to civil service levels, often a mere fraction of what private banks might pay.
5 Caprio and Summers (1995) argue that the increase of competition from the nonbanks and foreign banks
reduced the franchise value of bank licenses to the point that bank owners became less concerned with safe and
sound banking.  If interstate branching restrictions had been lifted in the 1950s, the resulting consolidation of U.S.
banking might have left the industry with only 2000 large. diversified,  and highly profitable banks. whose owners
then would have had more of a stake in ensuring that they would have been around to collect these large profits.
See also (.
6  New Zealand authorities have been moving away even from  supervising the financial system. based on the
argument that to do so provides the public with the expectation that the authorities are guaranteeing some return on
their funds.  However, it is too early to tell if this system will be either able to ward off instabilit\. or to persevere in
the face of it.
7 Even with high rewards for prudent risk taking, and notwithstanding  good screening by the authorities in
charge of granting licenses, there always will be some bankers with a sufficiently high rate of time preference that
they will be motivated to "loot."  See Akerlof and Romer, 1994.
'  And since private banks can afford to buy the very best "rocket scientists," the Wall Street term for the
mathematicians, physicists, and computer scientists who workl on inventing new, often option-based financial
products, the odds are against supervisory agencies uncovering excessive risks associated with these products in
time.
'  Indeed, what first attracted supervisors' attention was its rapid rate of growth and high real interest rates
(which eventually reached 30% to 50%).
See  Global Finance, September 1994.
See Simons and Cross, 1991, where it is noted that not only does the U.S. stock market fail to predict bank
performance but in the case of downgrading by supervisors. insiders bought stock more often than not in the
22immediate preceding quarter.
12 In assessing the soundness of banks, supervisors look at the so-called CAMEL variables -- capital, asset
quality, management, earnings. and liquidity.  Even modest  capital holdings will suffice if the others are strong.
'3 Speculation about the consequences of applying the death penalty or various forms of torture are beyond  the
scope of this paper, however much they might intrigue enraged authorities and taxpayers who have paid for the
shenanigans of "ebullient" bankers.
"' This solution used to be recommended for pollution taxes, as it is difficult to estimate the benefits and costs of
raising pollution abatement taxes. leading some practical  economists to suggest, rather than do nothing, to begin
raising the taxes to see if the resulting level of pollution was desirable, given the costs. Unsafe banking can be
treated as a similar, unsavory externality.
'5  In theory, Islamic banking. in which neither deposits nor "loans" bear fixed interest was to be a system in
which banks behave like mutual funds. However, perhaps  because of the demand by lenders and users of funds for
some certainty, these banks usual provide some guaranteed minimum return on deposits and also put limits on the
fluctuations of returns on investments.
6 While a more monopolistic banking system would be characterized  by higher spreads, bankers presumably
would figure out that they would need to be more competitive on liabilities, as depositors can be expected to be
more mobile than borrowers.
'' To be  wre, there may be a tradeoff between those preferences aud safe and sound
banking.
BS  Bankers m'nly  concentrate their risks due to: limited choice,  assets whose prices move in a highly correlated
fashion, linked ownership - concentrating loans on a firm that owns the bank, or one run by the bank president's
brother -- or more generally an inability to plan (de Juan,  1987).
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